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Abstract. We study the prisoner’s dilemma model with a noisy imitation
evolutionary dynamics on directed out-homogeneous and uncorrelated directed
random networks. An heterogeneous pair mean-field approximation is presented
showing good agreement with Monte Carlo simulations in the limit of weak
selection (high noise) where we obtain analytical predictions for the critical
temptations. We discuss the phase diagram as a function of temptation, intensity
of noise and coordination number of the networks and we consider both the model
with and without self-interaction. We compare our results with available results
for non-directed lattices and networks.
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1. Introduction
Dilemmas arise when it is advantageous for an individual to act selfishly by not taking
into account the overall performance of the group it belongs to[1, 2, 3, 4]. Such
dilemmas can be modeled by simple two agent games where each agent follows two
strategies, cooperation (C) and defection (D) and receive a payoff after each round that
depends on the chosen strategy. In the prisoners dilemma game[5, 6] (PD) a defector
facing a cooperator receives the highest payoff (T- temptation) higher than the second
best payoff (R- reward) received from mutual cooperation. The smallest payoff is
received by a cooperator facing a defector (S - sucker payoff), even smaller than the
payoff received from mutual defection (P- punishment). In a population of defectors,
an agent does not increase it’s payoff by changing it’s strategy to cooperation contrary
to the case of a population of cooperators where it is advantageous for an agent to
change to defection. Defection is the best reply to defection which classifies this
strategy as a Nash equilibrium in a game theory framework[2]. However, cooperation
is observed in social and biological systems even when from an agent point of view it
is better not to cooperate. Evolutionary games are obtained when the best strategies
become more frequent by giving a higher reproductive ability to agents following those
strategies. Several mechanisms for the evolution of cooperation were proposed, some of
them relying on strategies that assume repeated encounters and some sort of memory
[7].
Considering only pure strategies (C and D), it was found that the introduction of
a spatial or a network structure in the population [8, 9, 10, 11, 12] where an agent plays
with nearest neighbors (possibly including itself) and receives a total payoff collected
from each of those two agent games can lead to the emergence of cooperation.
The PD game has been studied in structured populations such as lattices[8,
9, 10, 13, 14], hierarchical lattices[15], empirical social networks[16], small world
networks[17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23], homogeneous random networks[24], single scale
[25, 23] and scale-free networks[22, 26, 25, 27, 23]. In the case of well mixed populations
and fully connected networks where the payoff of each agent depends directly on the
frequency of each strategy in the whole population the PD model evolves to a phase
where all agents are defectors. The clustering of cooperators in a spatial/network
structure allows cooperators to resist exploitation and the population may evolve
to a coexistence phase of cooperators and defectors[28]. Structural heterogeneity
in the number of neighbors was found to favor generically cooperation in the PD
game [21, 7, 25, 27] although this effect may depend on the details of the adopted
evolutionary rule [3, 29].
The distinction between the lattice/network of interactions where the agents play
and the lattice/network of influence where the learning and reproduction process
takes place[30, 31, 32] was previously introduced. In those studies both the network
of interactions and the network of influences was considered to be non-directed.
The influence between agents in empirical social networks is sometimes found to be
asymmetric and requiring modeling by directed networks[33]. This asymmetry may
be taken into account in the framework of evolving networks by considering time
evolving weights which depend on the outcome of ongoing interactions between the
agents[34, 3, 35, 36] .
In this work we study the PD model in the case where the network of interactions
and the network of learning are identical directed networks. Specifically, we consider
that when an agent A plays with it’s neighbor agent B ( which does not have A
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as its own neighbor) only A collects the payoff for the game between them. Even
though the PD game is a two agent game the payoffs (consequences) of the adopted
strategies (actions) may be collected asymmetrically by the two players engaged in
a particular interaction. In previous works the case of a single influential node with
long-range asymmetric interactions was considered[18] and the evolutionary dynamics
on a directed cycle (one dimensional directed lattice) where the payoffs of the two
agent games are collected asymmetrically was discussed[37].
Several techniques were used to study two player game models on spatial
structures such as Monte Carlo simulation, calculations of the probability of fixation
of mutant strategies[28] and the determination of the evolutionary stable strategies by
deriving an effective replicator dynamics[38, 39]. The last two techniques assume the
limit of weak selection and rely on mean-field (MF) pair approximation. [13, 3]. Unless
in conditions of weak selection, higher order cluster MF approximations[13, 24, 3],
going beyond the pair approximation, are usually needed to obtain accurate results.
Such higher order approximations were applied before to model dynamical processes in
regular lattices[40, 41, 13, 3] and networks with an homogeneous degree structure[42].
In directed lattices with a local tree like structure single-site MF approximations may
give surprisingly accurate results[43]. In this work, we present an heterogeneous single-
site and pair MF approximation for the PD game on a generic directed network taking
into account the degree heterogeneities and degree correlations. In general, there is no
unique way of deriving mean-field approximations from the master equation describing
dynamical processes in the networks[44, 45]. Our approach is close in spirit to the
annealed mean-field approximations previously used to study epidemic spreading in
heterogeneous networks[46, 47].
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: in section 2 we describe in
detail the version of the PD model and the networks considered; in section 3 we present
our single-site and pair MF approximations; in section 4 the results obtained for out-
homogeneous directed networks of different out-degree are presented; in section 5 we
compare the predictions of the pair approximation with Monte Carlo simulation for
the steady-state density of cooperators in Poissonian random directed networks and
finally in section 6 we summarize our main conclusions.
2. the model on directed random networks
We consider a scaled version of the payoff matrix of the PD model [8, 13] where the
reward payoff for mutual cooperation is set to unity, the temptation payoff received
by a D facing a C is b and all other payoffs are null. The dilemma strictly exists
for b > 1 when defecting becomes advantageous from the individual point of view.
When the game is played on a network, at each vertex, i , there is an agent that
receives a total payoff, Pi, that depends on the strategies adopted by the neighbors.
We study in more detail the case where self-interaction is included and the payoff for
a C is then equal to nC + 1 and the payoff for a D is equal to b nC , being nC the
number of neighbors that follow the strategy C. The inclusion of self-interaction may
be justified by seeing each agent as representing a group following a given strategy[8]
in a coarse-grained sense. Unless explicitly mentioned the results presented are for
the model with self-interaction. For a network with N vertices, where a vertex i has
ki neighbors, an imitation dynamics is considered such that a randomly chosen agent,
i, 1 ≤ i ≤ N chooses a random neighbor, iµ, 1 ≤ µ ≤ ki, and if this neighbor is
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following a different strategy it adopts the strategy of the neighbor with probability
pimitate(Pi, Piµ) =
1
1 + exp
(
−β
(
Piµ − Pi
)) , (1)
where T = β−1 is a temperature like parameter that controls the level of noise in the
strategy imitation process. The weak selection limit corresponds to large T when the
dependence of the imitation probability on the agent’s payoff difference is small and
linear. The above imitation dynamics[13] is sometimes called pairwise comparison
dynamics and it is just one of several possible reasonable evolutionary dynamics [48].
In a system where each agent has z neighbors the total payoff of the full cooperation
phase would be N (z + 1) and an alternating phase where each C is surrounded by D
and vice-versa, if possible, would have a total system payoff Nbz/2+N/2. Thus only
for b < 2+1/z (b < 2 without self-interaction) the full cooperation phase corresponds
to the maximum system payoff but, for any value of b, the full defection phase is
always the phase with the smallest system payoff. In a large fully connected network
the density of cooperators ρ(t) can be written as dρ/dt = ρ (1− ρ) tanh (βρ(1− b))
which, in the limit of weak selection, has the replicator equation form [2, 4] with a
solution that reaches zero for long times, when b > 1.
We study the model on two kinds of directed random networks where the
neighbors of a vertex are connected through outgoing links starting from a vertex.
In the directed out-homogeneous networks[49, 43] the number of out-links, z, is the
same for all vertices. The out-links are generated by selecting randomly, for each vertex
of the network, z other (different) vertices. The distribution of in-links is Poissonian
as for random networks. For z > 1 the system is in a percolating phase with a giant
strongly connected component containing a finite fraction of the vertices[43]. The
other kind of networks considered are directed random networks which are built by
establishing an outgoing link, i → j , from each vertex, i, to each other vertex, j
with probability q/N . The distribution of the number of outgoing links of a given
vertex as well as the distribution of the number of ingoing links is Poissonian with
an average value q. For these networks, vertices with no out-links (without neighbors)
may receive an arbitrary number of in-links, thus influencing other vertices, while their
own strategies do not suffer influence from others. To avoid this behavior we generated
the out-links starting from a truncated and renormalized Poisson distribution where
vertices with no out-going links have zero probability. The average number of out-links
of a vertex is then z = 〈kout〉 =
q
1−exp(−q) , always larger than unity. To generate these
networks we use a method based on the configuration model[50]: the out-degrees of
each vertex, i, are drawn from its probability distribution, thus generating ki stubs
which are ends of outgoing links emerging from the vertex i. These stubs are then
connected to randomly chosen vertices with the restriction of not repeating a vertex
and not allowing connections to itself.
The directed networks[51, 52, 53] are characterized by a joint in-degree and
out-degre distribution, P (kin, kout) and degree correlations Pin (k
′
in, k
′
out|kin, kout) and
Pout (k
′
in, k
′
out|kin, kout), which measure the probability to reach a vertex of degrees
k′in and k
′
out from a vertex of degrees kin andkout following, respectively, an in-link and
an out-link. For the particular case of networks with uncorrelated in-degre and out-
degree, P (kin, kout) = Pin(kin)Pout(kout) and with uncorrelated degree vertices, such
that Pin (k
′
in, k
′
out|kin, kout) and Pout (k
′
in, k
′
out|kin, kout) are independent of kin and kout
, it can be shown, from a detailed balance relation [53], that:
Pout (k
′
out|kout) = Pout(k
′
out). (2)
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i process rate, Ri n-dist l-dist
1 ···←Dk→Cs→···
∑
s ps(C,t)Pout(s|k) 〈pimitate(b(n+1),l+1)〉 Bk−1
(
ρ
(n)
k
(t)
)
Bs
(
ρ
(n)
s (t)
)
2 ···←Ck→Ds→···
∑
s(1−ps(C,t))Pout(s|k) 〈pimitate(n+1,b l)〉 Bk−1
(
ρ
(n)
k
(t)
)
Bs
(
ρ
(n)
s (t)
)
Table 1. Processes and corresponding rates for the single site mean-field
approximation for the model with self-interaction. The quantities Bm (x)
represent the Binomial distribution with m attempts and success probability, x.
The random networks considered in this work are uncorrelated in the sense defined
above.
3. Mean Field Theory
We derived an heterogeneous single-site and pair mean-field theory for the model
on a directed network characterized by an out-link degree-degree correlation
Pout (k
′
out|kout). Our approach can be easily applied to other network dynamic
models. The single-site approximation time evolution equation for the probability
pk(C, t) = 1− pk(D, t) to have a cooperator at a vertex of an out-degree k, at time t,
is:
d
dt
pk(C, t) = R1 (1− pk(C, t)) −R2 pk(C, t). (3)
The processes that contribute to the time evolution equation are listed in Table 1. The
summations in the rates, Ri are over the possible out-degree values of the neighboring
vertices of a given vertex and the average of the imitation probability over the possible
neighborhoods of the vertex and of the neighboring vertices are taken from binomial
distributions, Bm(x) where m is the number of attempts (number of neighbors taken
into the average) and x is the success probability of each attempt obtained from the
probability to find a C at a neighboring vertex of a vertex of a given degree, k, at
time t, ρ
(n)
k (t) that can be written as, ρ
(n)
k (t) =
∑
m pm(C, t)Pout(m|k). Note that for
a degree-degree uncorrelated network this quantity does not depend on the out-degree
k.
The processes that contribute to the pair approximation are listed in Table 2. The
time evolution equations for the probabilities, pk,m(XY, t) for a vertex with out-degree
k to follow strategy X = C,D and for a neighbor of that vertex, with out-degree m,
to follow strategy Y = C,D, at time t, are given by:
d
dt
pk,m (CC, t) = (R1 +R2) pk,m (DC, t) +R3 pk,m (CD, t)
− (R4 +R5) pk,m (CC, t)
d
dt
pk,m (CD, t) = R10 pk,m (DD, t) +R5 pk,m (CC, t)
− (R3 +R8 +R9) pk,m (CD, t)
d
dt
pk,m (DC, t) = R4 pk,m (CC, t) +R6 pk,m (DD, t)
− (R1 +R2 +R7) pk,m (DC, t)
d
dt
pk,m (DD, t) = (R8 +R9) pk,m (CD, t) +R7 pk,m (DC, t)
− (R10 +R6) pk,m(DD, t)
(4)
The averages of the imitation probabilities, included in Table 2, are taken
from binomial distributions, as in the single-site approximation case, with a success
probability given by the conditional probability, ρ
(n)
k (X, t) to find a C at a vertex
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i process rate, Ri n-dist l-dist
1 ···←Dk→Cm→··· 1
k
〈pimitate(b(n+1),l+1)〉 Bk−1
(
ρ
(n)
k
(D,t)
)
Bm
(
ρ
(n)
m (C,t)
)
2 · · · ← Cs տ
. . .ւ
Dk→Cm
k−1
k
∑
s
pk,s(DC,t)
p
(1)
k,s
(D,t)
Pout(s|k) 〈pimitate(b(n+2),l+1)〉 Bk−2
(
ρ
(n)
k
(D,t)
)
Bs
(
ρ
(n)
s (C,t)
)
3
Ck→Dm
ր Cs → · · ·
ց . . .
∑
s
pm,s(DC,t)
p
(1)
m,s(D,t)
Pout(s|m) 〈pimitate(b(n+1),l+1)〉 Bm−1
(
ρ
(n)
m (D,t)
)
Bs
(
ρ
(n)
s (C,t)
)
4 · · · ← Ds տ
. . .ւ
Ck→Cm
k−1
k
∑
s
pk,s(CD,t)
p
(1)
k,s
(C,t)
Pout(s|k) 〈pimitate(n+2,b l)〉 Bk−2
(
ρ
(n)
k
(C,t)
)
Bs
(
ρ
(n)
s (D,t)
)
5
Ck→Cm
ր Ds → · · ·
ց . . .
∑
s
pm,s(CD,t)
p
(1)
m,s(C,t)
Pout(s|m) 〈pimitate(n+1,b l)〉 Bm−1
(
ρ
(n)
m (C,t)
)
Bs
(
ρ
(n)
s (D,t)
)
6
Dk→Dm
ր Cs → · · ·
ց . . .
R3
7
Dk→Cm
ր Ds → · · ·
ց . . .
R5
8 ···←Ck→Dm→··· 1k 〈pimitate(n+1,b l)〉 Bk−1
(
ρ
(n)
k
(C,t)
)
Bm
(
ρ
(n)
m (D,t)
)
9 · · · ← Ds տ
. . .ւ
Ck→Dm
k−1
k
∑
s
pk,s(CD,t)
p
(1)
k,s
(C,t)
Pout(s|k) 〈pimitate(n+1,b l)〉 Bk−2
(
ρ
(n)
k
(C,t)
)
Bs
(
ρ
(n)
s (D,t)
)
10 · · · ← Cs տ
. . .ւ
Dk→Dm
k−1
k
∑
s
pk,s(DC,t)
p
(1)
k,s
(D,t)
Pout(s|k) 〈pimitate(b(n+1),l+1)〉 Bk−2
(
ρ
(n)
k
(D,t)
)
Bs
(
ρ
(n)
s (C,t)
)
Table 2. Processes and corresponding rates for the pair mean-field approximation
for the model with self-interaction. The quantities Bm (x) represent the Binomial
distribution as in Table 1.
neighbor to a vertex of out-degree k given that the agent at this vertex is following
strategy X = C,D. This quantity can be written as:
ρ
(n)
k (X, t) =
∑
m
pk,m(XC,t)
p
(1)
k,m
(X,t)
Pout (m|k) (5)
where p
(1)
k,m(X, t) = pk,m(XC, t) + pk,m(XD, t) .
The density of cooperators, ρ(t), is obtained, in the pair approximation, from:
ρ(t) =
∑
k,m
p
(1)
k,m(C, t)Pout(m|k)Pout(k)
In the derivation of the pair approximation, probabilities of configurations of more
than two out-linked vertices are approximated by probabilities of configurations of
pairs of out-linked vertices in the spirit of the probability approximation methods
previously applied to dynamical models on regular lattices [41, 40, 13, 3] .
4. out-homogeneous directed network
We studied the phase diagram of the prisoner’s dilemma model in the out-homogeneous
networks using the mean-field approximations and Monte Carlo simulations. The
model exhibits, generically, at lower temptation bc,1, a phase transition from a full
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Figure 1. Phase diagrams in the pair approximation (PA) for the out-
homogeneous networks with z = 2, 3, 4 and 5. The lower curves are bc,1 and
the upper curves are bc,2. The lines are the high temperature expansion results
presented in Eq. (6).
cooperation phase to an intermediate active phase, where both strategies survive, and,
at higher temptation, bc,2, a phase transition to a full defection state. The comparison
of the mean-field results with simulations shows that the single-site approximation is
not able to describe correctly the model and that the pair approximation gives a much
better agreement with simulation.
4.1. mean-field approximations
From a high temperature expansion we were able to obtain analytical results for the
transition parameters, bc,1and bc,2 for a network with an arbitrary number of outgoing
neighbors, z. For the single-site approximation we obtained bc,1 =
2z+1
2z and bc,2 = 2,
and for the pair approximation:
bc,1 =
2z+1
2z−1
bc,2 = 3 +
1
T
(z−1)2
(2z−1)2
. (6)
We also applied the method proposed in Ref. [54] to numerically study the MF
phase diagram in the temptation and temperature parameters space. The rate of the
time evolution of the density of cooperators in the equation dρ
dt
= F (ρ) was obtained
by solving, for each ρ, a set of modified dynamical equations that conserve ρ:
d
dt
p (CC, t) = R(DD, t)
d
dt
p (CD, t) = −R(DD, t)
d
dt
p (DC, t) = −R(DD, t)
d
dt
p (DD, t) = R(DD, t)
, (7)
where R(DD, t) is the total rate in the equation for d
dt
p(DD, t) in the pair
approximation equations (4) and F (ρ) is obtained from the stationary value of
R(CD, t) or R(CC, t) , by using F (ρ) = −R(CD,∞) = 12R(CC,∞).
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Figure 2. Function F (ρ) near the phase transitions at bc,1(with ρ ∼ 1, left and
bottom axis) and at bc,2 (with ρ ∼ 0, right and upper axis) for z = 4 and two
temperatures (a) T = 1 and (b) T = 0.1.
The zeros of d
dρ
F (ρ) near ρ = 1 and near ρ = 0 give the location of the
phase transitions at bc,1 and bc,2 , respectively. The nature of the phase transition
(continuous or discontinuous) can be obtained from the sign of the second order
derivative of F (ρ) at the phase transition[54]. The results obtained by integrating
the equations (7) until |R(DD, t)| < 10−12, for z = 2, 3, 4 and 5 are presented in Fig.
1. The behavior of F (ρ) near ρ = 1 and ρ = 0 with density values separated by
dρ = 10−5 was used to locate the phase transitions with an error in the temptation
parameter given by db = 10−4. Both phase transitions are predicted to be continuous
at any temperature and for any coordination number, z . In agreement with the high
temperature expansion results shown in Eq. (6) we obtained values of bc,1 almost
independent of temperature and values of bc,2 that increase for low temperatures from
high temperature values close to 3. At low temperatures the values of bc,2 are close
to z + 1. In Fig. 2 we show the behavior of F (ρ) near the two phase transitions for
z = 4 and two temperatures T = 1 (Fig. 2(a) )and T = 0.1 (Fig. 2(b) ). Note that,
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i Configuration ∆P
1 ···→D→C→C→··· 2−b
2 ···→D→C→D→··· 1−b
3 ···→C→D→D→··· −1
4 ···→C→D→C→··· b−1
Table 3. Payoff diferences, ∆P = Piµ − Pi between strategies at · · · → D →
C → · · · (configurations 1 and 2) and · · · → C → D → · · · (configurations 3 and
4) interfaces for the model with self-interaction with z = 1.
at low T, the determination of the zeros of F (ρ), corresponding to the transition at
bc,2 ∼ z + 1, require a high numerical precision due to the very small value taken
by F (ρ) near the origin. From the lower panel of Fig. 2 it is clear that the phase
with zero density of cooperators becomes stable only for high values of the temptation
parameter close to b ∼ 5.2.
4.2. z = 1 case
The time integration of the pair mean-field equations and simulations, for z = 1, show
that the two critical temptations are equal, bc,1 = bc,2 = 3, at any temperature, also
in agreement with the high temperature expansion result Eq. (6).
This behavior can be understood by looking at the payoff differences, ∆P =
Piµ − Pi , listed in Table 3 for the possible configurations at the interfaces D → C
(configurations 1 and 2 in Table 3) and C → D (configurations 3 and 4 in Table 3).
The behavior of the system is controlled by the rates associated with the motion
of the interfaces · · · → D → C → C → · · · and · · · → C → D → D → · · ·
(configurations 1 and 3, respectively) because the motion of the other interfaces lead
to the generation of configurations of these two types. For b ≤ 1 the rates for the
displacement of D → C interfaces are higher than the rates for C → D interfaces. For
b ≥ 3/2, the rate of increase of the number of defectors associated with configuration
· · · → C → D → C → · · · (configuration 4) becomes the higher rate in the system
but it generates configurations · · · → C → D → D → · · · ( configuration 3) which
moves, until b = 3, at a lower rate than the rate for the spreading of cooperators
· · · → D → C → C → · · · (configuration 1). Consequently, we expect, for b < bc = 3,
the system to reach full cooperation and, for b > bc = 3, the system to reach full
defection. This scenario remains valid at any nonzero temperature in spite of the
temperature dependence of the rates of motion of the interfaces. This behavior is also
in agreement with the results obtained for the pair approximation and simulations for
T = 10 and T = 1 shown in Figs. 4(a) and (b), respectively. The time integration
of the pair approximation equations reaches full cooperation and full defection very
slowly especially at high temperatures (see the two curves shown in Fig. 4(a) obtained
for a maximum integration time 106 and 107 where full cooperation for b < bc = 3 and
full defection for b > bc = 3 are still far from being reached). In the same figure we also
show the results of simulations for systems of size N = 103 and N = 104 showing a
strong size dependence but approaching the expected behavior in the thermodynamic
limit.
For the pair approximation, we have found that, exactly at b = bc = 3, ρ(∞)
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Figure 3. The stationary density of cooperators, ρ(∞) for z = 1 and b = 3
as a function of temperature from the pair approximation (PA, Eq. (8) ) and
simulations for systems of size N = 103and N = 104, taking averages over 104
samples and starting from an equal density of cooperators and defectors.
depends on temperature and initial condition and is given by the following expression:
ρ(∞) =
(
e2β−eβ
)
ρ (0)2 +
(
eβ + 1
)
ρ (0)
e2β+1− (e3β−e2β + eβ−1) ρ (0) (ρ (0)− 1)
. (8)
Results from simulations presented in Fig. 3 agree with the pair approximation result
(Eq (8)) at high temperatures and show some deviation at low temperatures.
At T =∞, each agent adopts the strategy of a randomly selected neighbor with
probability 12 and the model is related to the direct voter model on directed networks
considered in Ref. [53]. In this limit, the density of cooperators is conserved and it
remains equal to its initial value.
At T = 0 the interface dynamics becomes deterministic and some of the interfaces
are frozen while others are moving depending on the value of b (only interfaces with
∆P ≥ 0 move) . For b ≤ 1 only the D → C interfaces are active and the system
should reach full cooperation (except for frozen initial domains of defectors with a
negligible weight in large systems). For b > 1 the interface · · · → D → C → D → · · ·
is frozen and defectors with a neighbor cooperator that has a neighbor defector start
to survive and for b ≥ 2 the only active interface corresponds to the configuration
· · · → C → D → C → · · ·. After the disappearance of all cooperators with a neighbor
defector that has a neighbor cooperator the system will reach a frozen disordered
state, free of such configurations, with a final density of cooperators that depends on
its value on the starting configuration.
4.3. z > 1 case
For networks with a number of outgoing links, z, larger than one there is a region of
coexistence of strategies for b values between the two critical parameters bc,1 and bc,2.
In Fig. 4 we show, for z = 2, 4 and 10 the stationary density of cooperators obtained
by simulations of systems of size N = 104 for T = 10 (Fig. 4(a) ) and T = 1 (Fig. 4(b)
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Figure 4. Comparison of the predictions of the pair approximation (lines) and
Monte Carlo simulations (points) for the stationary density of cooperators ρ(∞)
for (a) T = 10 and (b) T = 1. The simulations were done for systems of size
N = 104 and averages were made over 100 samples. For z = 1 simulations are
shown for system sizes N = 103and 104 taking averages over 104 samples. For
the pair approximation the z = 1 results are not stationary and correspond to
cooperator densities reached at integration times 106 and 107in (a) and 106in (b).
) taking averages over 100 samples. In all our simulations the stationary averages were
obtained by neglecting the initial transient time dependence and averaging only over
samples that have not reached any of the two absorbing states (full cooperation and full
defection). We also plot the pair approximation predictions showing a good agreement
with MC simulations except near the phase transitions where slightly different values
for the critical temptation parameters are obtained. In the pair approximation, for the
network with z = 4 at T = 1 we got bc,1 = 1.2542(1) and bc,2 = 3.3241(1) and results
from simulations give bc,1 = 1.274(1) and bc,2 = 3.14(1). Furthermore, the agreement
between simulations and the pair approximation worsens as the temperature decreases.
The payoff differences at D → C interfaces take the possible values ∆PD→C =
m+ 1 − n b with 0 ≤ m ≤ z and 1 ≤ n ≤ z and at C → D interfaces take the values
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Figure 5. We compare the temptation dependence of the stationary density of
cooperators, ρ(∞) , for pair approximation (PA) and Monte Carlo simulations
(MC) at a low temperature, T = 0.1, for networks with z = 1, 2, 4 and 10. The
PA results for z = 1 were obtained from time integration for 106and 107 steps
showing a slow approach to the stationary behavior. Results for other values of
z were obtained from Eq. 7(MD) . The MC results were obtained for systems
of size N = 104 and N = 103 (for z = 4) to show the finite size effects at large
values of b, for very small densities of cooperators.
∆PC→D = n b − m − 1 with 0 ≤ m ≤ z − 1 and 0 ≤ n ≤ z, where m and n are
the possible number of cooperators in the neighborhood of the cooperator and of the
defector, respectively. At low temperatures, the dynamics at interfaces with negative
payoff differences is slow ( freezing at T = 0) which generates plateaus in the density
of cooperators in between the values of temptation, bn,m =
m+1
n
, where the payoffs
for the interfaces change sign.
Near the full cooperator state the most important configurations for the D → C
interfaces correspond to m = z and n = z which becomes inactive ( stopping creating
cooperators), at very low T, for b > bz,z = 1 + 1/z meaning that an isolated D
in a sea of C start surviving. The most important configuration for the C → D
interface, near the full cooperator state, correspond to m = z − 1 and n = z which
becomes active (starting creating defectors), at very low T, for b > bz,z−1 = 1. These
defectors will be at new C → D interfaces where the defector now has a neighboring
defector and the new interface is active and leading to the creation of new defectors
for b > bz−1,z−1 = 1/(1 − 1/z) ∼ 1 + 1/z . This explains the observation of values
of bc,1 close to 1, in agreement with the high temperature expansion, Eq. (6), which
gives a dependence on the network coordination number approaching 1 in the limit of
an infinite number of neighbors.
The most important configurations for D → C interfaces, near the full defection
state, correspond to m = 0 and n = 1 with ∆PD→C = 1 − b and for the C → D
interface m = 0 and n = 0 with ∆PC→D = −1 . However the motion of the D → C
interface with m = 0 and n = 1 generates a new cooperator which will be at a D → C
interface with m = 1 and n = 1 corresponding to ∆PD→C = 2− b . Thus, like in the
case for z = 1, we would expect that the processes that generate defectors will win over
those that generate cooperators for b > bc,2 ∼ 3 . At very low T, since cooperators
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without any neighboring cooperators always have higher payoffs than defectors also
without neighboring cooperators, independently of b, the interfaces C → D will be
sluggish, and cooperators may persist in the system for long times. Furthermore,
clusters of cooperators with a C connected to other C resist as long as the weakest
cooperators, in the periphery of the cluster, with no neighboring cooperators resist
invasion by defectors. The C in the root of a cluster connected to z cooperators is a
source of new C up to b = z + 1. The newly generated cooperators, in the new roots,
have only one neighboring C and, for values of b > 2, do not generate further spreading
of cooperators. At a finite, low T , the balance between the rate of disappearance of C
in the periphery of the cluster, where the cooperators have no neighboring cooperators,
and the rate of creation of new C, from a C with only one neighboring C remains the
most important balance leading to bc,2 = 3. However, the pair approximation is not
sensitive to the weakness of the newly generated cooperators and shows incorrectly,
at low temperatures, bc,2 ∼ z + 1, which is the temptation limit above which, at zero
temperature, all the processes generating cooperators stop.
In Fig. 5 we show for the low temperature, T = 0.1, the stationary density
of cooperators, ρ(∞), as a function of b, obtained from simulations and the pair
approximation for systems of z = 2, 4 and 10. The pair approximation results were
obtained from the modified dynamics (MD) Eq. (7) and time integration of the mean-
field equations (Eq. (4)) (for z = 1). The agreement of the pair approximation with
simulations is good for small values of b, but the height of the plateaus in ρ(∞), for
b ≥ 2, when ρ(∞) . 0.1, are not correctly predicted by the pair approximation. The
simulation results for z = 4 and sizes N = 103 and 104 show that for b & 3 the
observed plateaus have heights that decrease with the size of the system suggesting
that in the thermodynamic limit the system reaches the full defection absorbing state.
We determined bc,2 from simulations of the time dependent behavior of ρ(t) for a
network with z = 4 and size N = 106 (see Fig. 6) obtaining bc,2 = 3.11(1) which is
much smaller than the value bc,2 ∼ 5 predicted by the pair approximation. For large
times we observe ρ(t) ∼ 1/t as expected for the mean-field universality class of phase
transitions to a single absorbing state[55].
It is interesting to comment on the behavior of the system for increasing values of
z: for very large z, we approach the fully connected network limit, where it is known
that the system jumps from full cooperation to full defection at b = 1. Our results
show that for large z, the critical temptation bc,1 gets closer to 1 and the density of
cooperators decays very strongly for b > bc.1 but still shows a small nonzero value for
temptation values up to bc,2 which does not approach bc,1 for arbitrary large z.
4.4. model without self-interaction
We can repeat the above arguments for the model without self-interaction and conclude
that for z = 1 we have, bc,1 = bc,2 = 1 with a suppression of cooperation for b > 1 .
For larger z we have now bn,m =
m
n
and near the full cooperator state a single D at
a D → C interface start surviving, at low T , for b > bz,z = 1. The C → D interfaces
with m = z−1 and n = z lead to new C → D interfaces with m = z−1 and n = z−1
which are active and leading to the proliferation of defectors, for b > bz−1,z−1 = 1.
Consequently, we expect bc,1 ∼ 1. Considering now configurations close to the full
defection state we see that a single cooperator at a C → D interface in a sea of
defectors has △PC→D = 0 and such interface is always active. The D → C interface
for the cooperator in the sea of defectors (m = 0 and n = 1 ) has △PD→C = −b and it
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Figure 6. Monte Carlo simulations of the time dependence of the density of
cooperators, ρ(t), at a low temperature T = 0.1 for a network with z = 4 with
a system size N = 106 showing that bc,2 = 3.11(1), much smaller than the value
predicted by the pair approximation. The power law fit of ρ(t), for large times,
shown in the plot, has a slope α = −0.998. In the inset we present the full curve
ρ(t) including the behavior at short times.
is inactive at very low T . The production of C occurs predominantly at configurations
where a C has a neighboring C (m = 1 and n = 1 ) with △PD→C = 1 − b and
the balance between C production and D production turns in favor of defectors for
b > bc,2 ∼ 1. From an high temperature expansion (weak selection limit) we obtained
from the pair approximation:
bc,1 = 1−
1
T
(z−1)2
8z3−12z2+6z−1
bc,2 = 1 +
1
T
(z−1)2
(2z−1)2
. (9)
Contrary to the case with self-interaction a cluster of C in a sea of D is not
stable at low T because now the cooperators in the periphery (with no neighboring
C) do not resist invasion by defectors. Consider the cluster D → C → C → D with
a D → C and a C → D interface and consider that the remaining neighbors are
all D . At T = 0, the D → C interface is frozen for b > 1 and the activity at the
interface C → D leads to the disappearance of the cooperators. For the cluster to
be sustainable there is need for the interfaces C → D in the periphery to move at a
lower rate than the interfaces D → C at the root which leads to the balance being in
favor of defectors for b > 1. When the defector at the D → C interface is facing a
C with, for example, two neighboring C, then cooperators are generated with higher
rate determined by the payoff difference 2−b but still the newly generated C will have
only one C neighbor and again for b > 1 defectors will win. In Fig.7 we show the pair
approximation phase diagram using the same method previously applied to the model
with self-interaction. In the inset we see that the high temperature expansion Eq. 9
agrees well with the numerical results.
At very low T we obtain for the pair approximation a value bc,2 ∼ 1 for z = 2 and
bc,2 ∼ 2 for z > 2. This difference in behavior may be related with the different relative
statistical weight given by the pair approximation to configurations with a C with one
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Figure 8. Comparison of pair approximation (PA) and MC simulation results
for the steady state density of cooperators for the model without self-interaction
at a low temperature T = 0.1 and for out-homogeneous directed networks with
z = 2, 4 and 10.
and two C as neighbors for z = 2 and z > 2 because if the configurations with two
neighboring C are predominant we expect the rate of creation of C to be determined
by the payoff difference 2−b leading to bc,2 ∼ 2 . We made MC simulations of networks
with, z = 2, 4 and 10, at a low temperature, T = 0.1 , and the results shown in Fig. 8
correspond to a value bc,2 ∼ 1.2 much smaller than the pair approximation prediction.
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Figure 9. Comparison of the pair approximation (PA) and simulations (MC)
of the PD model with self-interaction for uncorrelated directed random networks
with size N = 104, with average number of neighbors, 〈z〉 = 1.582 (q=1), 2.313
(q=2), 〈z〉 = 3.1572 (q=3) and 〈z〉 = 4.0746 (q=4).
5. Random directed networks
In random directed networks the distribution of the number of outgoing links of a
given vertex is Poissonian and strongly peaked at its average number. The behavior
of the stationary density of cooperators is expected to follow the same trend as for
out-homogeneous directed random networks with a given number of outgoing links. To
test the accuracy of the mean-field pair approximation in Eq. (4) for an heterogeneous
case we compared it with MC simulations, for the model with self-interaction at T = 1
for different average number of out-neighbors. The results in Fig. 9 show that the
pair approximation provides a reasonably good approximation for the behavior of the
system. Since we use a modified Poissonian distribution, as described in section 2, the
limit q → 0 of these networks corresponds exactly to out-homogeneous networks with
z = 1.
6. Concluding Remarks
We have derived an heterogeneous pair mean-field approximation that is able to
correctly describe the behavior of the prisoner’s dilemma model in directed networks in
the limit of high T (weak selection). At low T the pair approximation gives predictions
for the critical parameter bc,2 in disagreement with MC simulation. The pair
approximation was numerically studied by using a very efficient method, previously
applied to other models[54], which is based on modified dynamical equations that solve
the time-dependent equations under the constraint of a given density of cooperators.
We also obtained analytical expressions for the two critical parameters bc,1 and bc,2
in the limit of high temperature. For the model with self-interaction bc,1 has a weak
temperature dependence and approaches 1 for large z and bc,2 is close but larger than
3 for any z. Without self-interaction, at any temperature, bc,1 is close but smaller than
1 and bc,2 is greater but close to 1 . Essentially, the inclusion of the self-interaction
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promotes a shift of bc,2 from values close to 1 to values close to 3. The case z = 1
is a special case where, in both cases, bc,1 = bc,2, independent of temperature. In
the model without self-interaction we find bc,1 = bc,2 = 1 and cooperation is fully
suppressed for b > 1 while in the model with self-interaction the full cooperator state
is still reached for temptation values up to bc,1 = bc,2 = 3. In both models the
coexistence region does not shrink as z increases but the levels of cooperation strongly
decrease with increasing z, as the networks get closer to the fully connected limit.
This behavior is similar to the one previously reported for one-dimensional regular
lattices with varying coordination number[22]. We can also compare our results to
other available results for non-directed lattices and random networks. The inclusion
of self-interaction increases bc,2 from ∼ 1.035 to ∼ 1.85, at T = 0.1 in the square lattice
(see Refs [13, 14]) while in our out-homogeneous directed networks we observe a much
larger increase in bc,2. In previous studies of non-directed lattices and random regular
graphs[14, 24] two types of phase diagrams were found: (1) one where bc,2 shows a
non-monotonous dependence with T , being equal to 1 at T = 0 and T = ∞ and
(2) another type where bc,2 decreases with T showing the highest value in the noise-
free limit T = 0 . Our MC simulation results suggest that the phase diagram in the
directed networks studied here are of the first type showing an equal high and low T
limits for bc,2 although not equal to 1 in the case of the model with self-interaction. It
is not clear if it is possible to observe phase diagrams of type (2) in directed networks.
Our main results were obtained for out-homogeneous networks but we expect the
main conclusions to apply also to directed random networks with Poissonian in and
out degree distributions.
The study of evolutionary dynamics in other types of directed networks and
in mixed directed/ non-directed networks taking into consideration the difference
between interaction and learning/reproduction networks may be relevant for the
modeling of real systems.
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